Natural Rationality | decision-making in the economy of nature
Showing posts with label social cognition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label social cognition. Show all posts

4/20/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - X - Game Theory

Here is the tenth and final chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free ebook-in-progress: Game Theory and Normative Social Cognition


INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER MINDS

1. The Other Minds
2. Rationality and Interpretation


PART TWO: OUR EVERYDAY PSYCHOLOGY

3. Simulation and Theory-Theory
4. Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives
5.Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts


PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL MIND

6. Neurons that Mirror

7. Social Primates and the Evolution of Social Cognition
8. The Modularity of The Social Mind
9. Social Intelligence

PART FOUR: RATIONALITY, GAME THEORY AND SOCIALITY
10. Game Theory and Normative Social Cognition

CONCLUSION

Bibliography on Philosophy and Social Cognition



I will revise it one day and make it more coherent, but in it's current form it should be useful as an introduction to the Philosophy of Social Cognition.

I would like to thank Patrick Parslow, (OdinLab, SSE, University of Reading) for his help with the proofreading.



3/27/08

A Short Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Social Cognition


One of the assignment for my course "The Social Mind" is a short encyclopedia entry. Students have to write a succinct, focused entry (about 500 words) on a topic relevant for the philosophy of social cognition (i.e. where philosophy of mind meets social philosophy ). All these entries will be available online there:

http://philosophyofsocialcognition.pbwiki.com/



All the listed entries on the front page are already attributed to students. If, however, you would like to contribute another entry, send me your suggestions.


EDITORIAL GUIDELINES

The goal is to create a concise but useful philosophical encyclopedia on folk-psychology, mind reading, interpretation, social cognition and other related subjects. You should contribute an entry that presents, in simple words, important concepts in the field. If you want to submit an entry:

  1. Send me a brief email with an outline of the entry you would like to write; do NOT choose an entry listed on the Encyclopedia frontpage.
  2. Once I accepted your project entry, send it as an attached .DOC, or .RTF file to benoithv@gmail.com.
  3. The text should not be longer than 500 words. If you use a term in your entry that will appear elsewhere in the encyclopedia, CAPITALIZE it. End your entries by writing “See also . . .” and up to 5 (capitalized) related key terms that appear elsewhere in the encyclopedia. Do not use italics, footnotes or endnotes.



The Philosophy of Social Cognition - IX - Social Intelligence

Here is the ninth chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free ebook-in-progress: Social Intelligence



Front Matter


INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER MINDS

1. The Other Minds
2. Rationality and Interpretation


PART TWO: OUR EVERYDAY PSYCHOLOGY

3. Simulation and Theory-Theory
4. Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives
5.Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts


PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL MIND

6. Neurons that Mirror

7. Social Primates and the Evolution of Social Cognition
8. The Modularity of The Social Mind
9. Social Intelligence

PART FOUR: RATIONALITY, GAME THEORY AND SOCIALITY
10...
11...

CONCLUSION

Bibliography on Philosophy and Social Cognition





The Philosophy of Social Cognition - VIII - The Modularity of The Social Mind

Here is the eighth chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free ebook-in-progress: The Modularity of The Social Mind



3/9/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - VII - 7. Social Primates and the Evolution of Social Cognition

Here is the seventh chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition",the free ebook-in-progress: Social Primates and the Evolution of Social Cognition





INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER MINDS

1. The Other Minds
2. Rationality and Interpretation


PART TWO: OUR EVERYDAY PSYCHOLOGY

3. Simulation and Theory-Theory
4. Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives
5.Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts


PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL MIND

6. Neurons that Mirror

7. Social Primates and the Evolution of Social Cognition



3/8/08

Darwin's evolutionary social psychology

While reading the chapter 5 of Darwin's The Descent of Man, I noticed that Darwin reconstruct Human evolutionary history as--forgive the anachronism--a gene-culture co-evolution. Of course, there was no concept of gene in Darwin's time, so the correct label would be "nature-culture co-evolution", but I was amazed to see how his intuitions are closed to current theories. Basically, he described our evolution as an evolutionary arms race (another anachronism) between social life and intelligence. The process goes trough 3 phases: social instinct, social intelligence, and social reasoning:

1. Social instincts: learning and sympathy

General intelligence
  • It deserves notice that, as soon as the progenitors of man became social (and this probably occurred at a very early period), the principle of imitation, and reason, and experience would have increased, and much modified the intellectual powers in a way, of which we see only traces in the lower animals.
Social instincts: sympathy, fidelity, and courage
  • In order that primeval men, or the apelike progenitors of man, should become social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings, which impel other animals to live in a body; and they no doubt exhibited the same general disposition. They would have felt uneasy when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have felt some degree of love; they would have warned each other of danger, and have given mutual aid in attack or defence. All this implies some degree of sympathy, fidelity, and courage.
2. Social intelligence--reciprocity and approbation

Reciprocity:
  • as the reasoning powers and foresight of the members became improved, each man would soon learn that if he aided his fellow-men, he would commonly receive aid in return. From this low motive he might acquire the habit of aiding his fellows; and the habit of performing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the feeling of sympathy which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover, followed during many generations probably tend to be inherited.
Approbation
  • [a] powerful stimulus to the development of the social virtues, is afforded by the praise and the blame of our fellow-men. primeval man, at a very remote period, was influenced by the praise and blame of his fellows. It is obvious, that the members of the same tribe would approve of conduct which appeared to them to be for the general good, and would reprobate that which appeared evil.
3. Social reasoning--norms, rules and morality
  • With increased experience and reason, man perceives the more remote consequences of his actions, and the self-regarding virtues, such as temperance, chastity, &c., which during early times are, as we have before seen, utterly disregarded, come to be highly esteemed or even held sacred.



3/5/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - VI - Neurons that Mirror


Here is the sixth chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free-e-book-in-progress: Neurons that Mirror (note that all chapter have been slightly edited--I use another font that should be easier to read on-screen--and the book is now divided in sections)


PART ONE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER MINDS

1. The Other Minds
2. Rationality and Interpretation


PART TWO: OUR EVERYDAY PSYCHOLOGY

3. Simulation and Theory-Theory
4. Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives
5.Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts


PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL MIND

6. Neurons that Mirror



3/3/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - V - Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts

Here is the fifth chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free-e-book-in-progress: Experimental Approaches to Folk-Psychology: Moral Judgments and Pluralistic Accounts.




2/7/08

All the lonely people, where do they all belong?

Ah, look at all the lonely people
Ah, look at all the lonely people

Eleanor Rigby picks up the rice in the church where a wedding has been
Lives in a dream
Waits at the window, wearing the face that she keeps in a jar by the door
Who is it for?

All the lonely people
Where do they all come from ?
All the lonely people
Where do they all belong ?

- (The Beatles, Eleanor Rigby)


In a fascinating study (well, I find it fascinating), Epley et al., showed that lonely people or people induced to feel lonely are more prone to anthropomorphize nonhuman animals and gadgets and have stronger belief in supernatural agents. Social disconnection creates not only pain (as other research in neuroscience showed), but also over-attribution of intentionality.


Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science 19 (2), 114–120.



2/6/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - IV - Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives

Here is the fourth chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free-e-book-in-progress:Embodied Phenomenology and Narratives



2/1/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - III - Simulation and Theory-Theory

Here is the third chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition", the free-e-book-in-progress: Simulation and Theory-Theory




1/23/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - II - Rationality and Interpretation

Here is the second chapter of "The Philosophy of Social Cognition",
the free-e-b00k-in-progress: Rationality and Interpretation




1/17/08

The Philosophy of Social Cognition - I - The Other Minds

I am currently teaching an undergrad Philosophy of Mind course at U of T. I called it "The Social Mind: Mentality and Sociality" (see this page). I present it a course on the "philosophy of social cognition", i.e., the overlap between (naturalized) philosophy of mind and (naturalized) social philosophy. I will try to convert my notes in short texts that, together, will constitutes a free e-book called The Philosophy of Social Cognition: An Introduction to the Philosophical Approaches of Mentality and Sociality. The idea is to focus on philosophical questions that are relevant for contemporary research on social cognition.


The chapters will be posted on this blog (follow the tag POSC) and on my website (http://www.hardyvallee.net/POSC/) NOTE THAT THIS IS A WORK IN PROGRESS, not a final product.

Here is the first chapter: "The Other Minds" (PDF)



12/19/07

New draft paper on folk-epistemology

as usual, comments welcome !

Hardy-Vallée, B. (submitted) Folk Epistemology as Normative Social Cognition.



11/3/07

Oxytocin and Sociality

Oxytocin is really the sociality hormone. It is involved in recognition (Popik et al., 1992) and postcoital bonding (Waldherr & Neumann, 2007). It improves mindreading in autistic (Hollander et al., 2006) and non-autistic humans (Domes et al., 2007b). It increases trust (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2005) and generosity (Stanton et al., 2007). It was generally thought that its modus operandi is a modulation of amygdala (associated with fear) (Kirsch et al., 2005), but a new paper by (Domes et al., 2007a) suggests that it attenuates amygdala responses tout court.

References
  • Domes, G., Heinrichs, M., Glascher, J., Buchel, C., Braus, D. F., & Herpertz, S. C. (2007a). Oxytocin Attenuates Amygdala Responses to Emotional Faces Regardless of Valence. Biological Psychiatry, 62(10), 1187-1190.
  • Domes, G., Heinrichs, M., Michel, A., Berger, C., & Herpertz, S. C. (2007b). Oxytocin Improves "Mind-Reading" In Humans. Biological Psychiatry, 61(6), 731-733.
  • Hollander, E., Bartz, J., Chaplin, W., Phillips, A., Sumner, J., Soorya, L., Anagnostou, E., & Wasserman, S. (2006). Oxytocin Increases Retention of Social Cognition in Autism. Biol Psychiatry.
  • Kirsch, P., Esslinger, C., Chen, Q., Mier, D., Lis, S., Siddhanti, S., Gruppe, H., Mattay, V. S., Gallhofer, B., & Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2005). Oxytocin Modulates Neural Circuitry for Social Cognition and Fear in Humans. J Neurosci, 25(49), 11489-11493.
  • Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans. Nature, 435(7042), 673-676.
  • Popik, P., Vetulani, J., & van Ree, J. M. (1992). Low Doses of Oxytocin Facilitate Social Recognition in Rats. Psychopharmacology (Berl), 106(1), 71-74.
  • Stanton, A. A., Ahmadi, S., & Zak, P. J. (2007). Oxytocin Increases Generosity. Paper presented at the Economic Science Association 2007 World Meeting.
  • Waldherr, M., & Neumann, I. D. (2007). Centrally Released Oxytocin Mediates Mating-Induced Anxiolysis in Male Rats. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(42), 16681-16684.
  • Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2005). Oxytocin Is Associated with Human Trustworthiness. Hormones and Behavior, 48(5), 522-527.



10/4/07

Social Neuroeconomics: A Review by Fehr and Camerer

Ernst Fehr and Colin Camerer, two prominent experimental/behavioral/neuro-economists published a new paper in Trends in Cognitive Science on social neuroeconomics. Discussing many studies (this paper is a state-of-the-art review), they conclude that

social reward activates circuitry that overlaps, to a surprising degree, with circuitry that anticipates and represents other types of rewards. These studies reinforce the idea that social preferences for donating money, rejecting unfair offers, trusting others and punishing those who violate norms, are genuine expressions of preference

The authors illustrate this overlap with a the following picture: social and non-social reward elicit similar neural activation (see references for all cited studies at the end of this post):



Figure 1. (from Fehr and Camerer, forthcoming). Parallelism of rewards for oneself and for others: Brain areas commonly activated in (a) nine studies of social reward (..), and (b) a sample of six studies of learning and anticipated own monetary reward (..).

So basically, we have enough evidence to justify a model of rational agents as entertaining social preferences. As I argue in a forthcoming paper (let me know if you want to have a copy), these findings will have normative impact, especially for game-theoretic situations: if a rational agent anticipate other agents's strategies, she better anticipate that they have social preferences. For instance, one might argue that in the Ultimatum Game, it is rational to make a fair offer.


Related posts:

Reference:
  • Fehr, E. and Camerer, C.F., Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences, Trends Cogn. Sci. (2007), doi:10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.002


Studies of social reward cited in Fig. 1:

  • [26] J. Rilling et al., A neural basis for social cooperation, Neuron 35 (2002), pp. 395–405.
  • [27] J.K. Rilling et al., Opposing BOLD responses to reciprocated and unreciprocated altruism in putative reward pathways, Neuroreport 15 (2004), pp. 2539–2543.
  • [28] D.J. de Quervain et al., The neural basis of altruistic punishment, Science 305 (2004), pp. 1254–1258.
  • [29] T. Singer et al., Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others, Nature 439 (2006), pp. 466–469
  • [30] J. Moll et al., Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 103 (2006), pp. 15623–15628.
  • [31] W.T. Harbaugh et al., Neural responses to taxation and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations, Science 316 (2007), pp. 1622–1625.
  • [32] Tabibnia, G. et al. The sunny side of fairness – preference for fairness activates reward circuitry. Psychol. Sci. (in press).
  • [55] T. Singer et al., Brain responses to the acquired moral status of faces, Neuron 41 (2004), pp. 653–662.
  • [56] B. King-Casas et al., Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange, Science 308 (2005), pp. 78–83.

Studies of learning and anticipated own monetary reward cited in Fig. 1:

  • [33] S.M. Tom et al., The neural basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk, Science 315 (2007), pp. 515–518.
  • [61] M. Bhatt and C.F. Camerer, Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence, Games Econ. Behav. 52 (2005), pp. 424–459.
  • [73] P.K. Preuschoff et al., Neural differentiation of expected reward and risk in human subcortical structures, Neuron 51 (2006), pp. 381–390.
  • [74] J. O’Doherty et al., Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning, Science 304 (2004), pp. 452–454.
  • [75] E.M. Tricomi et al., Modulation of caudate activity by action contingency, Neuron 41 (2004), pp. 281–292.



9/10/07

Social Cognition: A Special Issue of Science

The new edition of Science if devoted to Social Cognition. It
(...) explores the adaptive advantages of group life and the accompanying development of social skills. News articles examine clues from our primate cousins about the evolution of sophisticated social behavior and explorations of human behavior made possible by computer-generated realities. Review articles dissect the human capacity for prospection and the links between sociality and brain evolution and fitness. And related podcast segments highlight research on the social abilities of children and chimps and the value of virtual worlds to studies of social science

Four papers you don't want to miss:

Moreover, in the same edition, psychologists Dan Gilbert and Tim Wilson presents a theory of prospection, the anticipation of future events (a subject important for decision-making research:

All animals can predict the hedonic consequences of events they've experienced before. But humans can predict the hedonic consequences of events they've never experienced by simulating those events in their minds. Scientists are beginning to understand how the brain simulates future events, how it uses those simulations to predict an event's hedonic consequences, and why these predictions so often go awry.



8/23/07

Biology of Societies: A Special Issue of Current Biology



Recommended reading for anybody interested in social cognition, sociality, and biology: The last issue of Current Biology is devoted to the Biology of Societies:






  • Frank, S. A. (2007). All of life is social. Current Biology, 17(16), R648-R650.
  • Jackson, D. E. (2007). Social spiders. Current Biology, 17(16), R650-R652.
  • Clayton, N. S., & Emery, N. J. (2007). The social life of corvids. Current Biology, 17(16), R652-R656.
  • Watts, H. E., & Holekamp, K. E. (2007). Hyena societies. Current Biology, 17(16), R657-R660.
  • West, S. A., Griffin, A. S., & Gardner, A. (2007). Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation. Current Biology, 17(16), R661-R672.
  • Boomsma, J. J. (2007). Kin Selection versus Sexual Selection: Why the Ends Do Not Meet. Current Biology, 17(16), R673-R683.
  • Shaulsky, G., & Kessin, R. H. (2007). The Cold War of the Social Amoebae. Current Biology, 17(16), R684-R692.
  • Cremer, S., Armitage, S. A. O., & Schmid-Hempel, P. (2007). Social Immunity. Current Biology, 17(16), R693-R702.
  • Leadbeater, E., & Chittka, L. (2007). Social Learning in Insects -- From Miniature Brains to Consensus Building. Current Biology, 17(16), R703-R713.
  • Byrne, R. W., & Bates, L. A. (2007). Sociality, Evolution and Cognition. Current Biology, 17(16), R714-R723.
  • Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2007). Social Cognition in Humans. Current Biology, 17(16), R724-R732.



7/24/07

The linguistic basis of social preferences

Surprising (at least to me) finding, published in PNAS today. Young infants display a strong preference for agents that speak their own language. More than smell, look, and sound, social attachment seems to be mediated by linguistic (and accent) similarity. We like those who speak like us. From this findings, researchers draw three conclusions:

First, language provides a cue to social preferences, even in infants who have not begun to produce or understand speech. Second, the tendency to favor otherwise unfamiliar members of one's own social group begins to emerge early in human life and well before children begin to learn about the nature and history of social-group conflicts. The passage from infants' social preferences to adults' social conflicts may be long and circuitous, but such a path may exist and may explain, in part, why conflicts among different language and social groups are pervasive and difficult to eradicate. Third, because human languages vary, and the native language must be learned, the tendency to make social distinctions is shaped by experience. Because language learning is especially adaptable early in development, social preferences also may be malleable at young ages. This early adaptability of preference formation for familiar characteristics of individuals may obtain for many potential indicators of social group membership.